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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
AUTOMOBILES-SHARING OF EXPENSES As EVIDENCE OF JoINT ADVENTURE GuEST ACT -Through a mutual friend, respondents arranged

with appellant car owner for transportation to an out-of-town football game,
and it was agreed between the parties that the passengers should reimburse the
owner for the expenses of transportation and cost of lunch provided by the
appellant. After the game the parties decided to drive to another town for ·
dinner; en route the car skidded and overtl:lrned as a result of appellant's
negligence, and the respondent wife was seriously injured. Held, that the members of the party were engaged in a "joint adventure" so that the automobile
guest statute would not bar recovery for injuries sustained by respondent wife as
a result of appellant's negligence. Pence v. Berry, 13 Wash. (2d) 564, 125
P.(2d) 645 (1942).
.
In this decision the court recognizes the essential elements of a joint adventure to be (I) contract, ( 2) common purpose, (3) community of interest, and .
( 4) equal right to a voice, accompanied by an equal right of control.1 The
great weight of authority, however, emphasizes only the latter two of these
elements; 2 a small minority of decisions disregard the necessity of control and
find a joint enterprise based simply on a common purpose.8 In considering
1 Instant case, 13 Wash. (2d) at 570.
In the state of Washington these four
elements have been the criteria of a joint adventure since the cases of Lampe v. Tyrell,
200 Wash. 589, 94 P. (2d) 193 (1939), and Carboneau v. Peterson, 1 Wash. (2d)
347, 95 P. (2d) 1043 (1939).
In respect to the element of contract these cases hold that the relationship of joint
adventurer cannot be established "by mere loose statements, with no thought of any
contractual obligation," Lampe v. Tyrell, supra; and that a contribution toward the
purchase of gasoline is not of itself sufficient to elevate an informal arrangement to the
dignity of a contract. Carboneau v. Peterson, supra.
The majority of cases hold that a mere unaccepted offer to share expenses does
not affect the status of a person riding in the car as a mere guest. Master v. Horowitz,
237 App. Div. 237, 261 N.Y.S. 722 (1932); Duncan v. Hutchinson, 139 Ohio St.
185, 39 N.E. (2d) 140 (1942). Contra, Johnson v. Fischer, 292 Mich. 78, 290
N.W. 334 (1940), where offer to buy gasoline was not accepted, but there was
evidence of control by passenger over driver in the way of directing routes to be taken.
A tacit understanding or expectancy that passenger would supply gasoline does not
impose obligations of joint enterprise. Eubanks v. Kielsmeier, 171 Wash. 484, 18 P.
(2d) 48 (1933). Sharing of expenses, other than transportation costs, is not evidence
of a common adventure. Adamson v. McEwen, 12 Ga. App. 508, 77 S.E. 591
(1913), guest to pay hotel expenses; Gill v. Arthur, 69 Ohio App. 386, 43 N.E. (2d)
894 (1941), group of boys, including driver, shared cost of a keg of beer; Chaplowe
v. Powsner, II9 Conn. 188, 175 A. 470 (1934), guest supplied theatre tickets;
Syverson v. Berg, 194 Wash. 86, 77 P. (2d) 382 (1938), guest supplied lodging at
relative's house on overnight trip; Koplitz v. City of St. Paul, 86 Minn. 373, 90 N.W;
794 (1902), girls supplied lunch for picnic.
2 Cunningham v. City of Thief River Falls, 84 Minn. 21, 86 N.W. 763 (1901);
St. Louis & S. F. Ry. v. Bell, 58 Okla. 84, 149 P. 336 (1915); HUDDY, ,AUTOMOBILES, 6th ed., § 682, p. 893 (1922).
8 See Weintraub, "The Joint Enterprise Doctrine in Automobile Law," 16 CoRN.
L. Q. 320 at 331 (1931), for_ collection of cases following the "common purpose"
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the doctrine of the joint enterprise as applied to fact situations similar to the
present case (i.e., where there has been a sharing of expenses of transportation),
some courts have found that a joint enterprise does exist; 4 while other
courts have held that the sharing of expenses by itself is not evidence of a joint
undertaking. 5 The important factor in determining whether a joint enterprise
exists under the particular set of facts is the element of control. Control does
not mean the right to interfere at will in the driving of the car, but merely
equal right of control and "of general supervision over the instrumentality, equal
authority in directing how the instrumentality is to be used in the performance
of the enterprise, and likewise, equal responsibility for the manner of such
performance." 6 Some courts require a close legal relationship between the
parties before they will find a joint enterprise: there must be circumstances
doctrine. Contra: Corn v. Kansas City, C.C. & St. J. Ry., (Mo. 1921) 228
S.W. 78 at 82, where it was held that common purpose alone was not enough if the
purpose was not a business one, and that the common purpose af a husband and wife
on way to depot to pick up daughter did not constitute a joint enterprise. "The
general rule is stated to be 'a mere guest or ••• passenger who is riding in the machine,
but who has no authority either over the machine or over the driver,' is not chargeable
with the driver's negligence." Quoting Tannehill v. Kansas City, C. & S. Ry., 279
Mo. 158 at 170-171, 213 S.W. 818 (1919). If it can be said that a wife has no
control over a husband's driving, how much more is it true that a friend sharing
expenses has no such control.
4
O'Brien v. Woldson, 149 Wash. 192, 270 P. 304 (1928); Lloyd v. Mowery,
158 Wash. 341, 290 P. 710 (1930) (a joint enterprise is an undertaking for the
mutual benefit or pleasure of the parties--no consideration of the element of control) ;
Jensen v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 133 Wash. 208, 233 P. 635 (1925) (which
specifically denied the requirement of any element of control in a joint enterprise; the
court said, "That is the rule when the question of the relationship is master and servant
or principal and agent, but it is not the rule with referel}ce to a joint enterprise or a
community of interest." The Jensen case was cited with approval in Forman v. Shields,
183 Wash. 333, 48 P. (2d) 599 (1935).
5
McCann v. Hoffman, 9 Cal. (2d) 279 at 285, 70 P. (2d) 909 (1937), noted
36 M1cH. L. REv. 835 (1938) (held that sharing of expenses is usually "nothing
more than the exchange of social amenities"); Zeigler v. Ryan, 65 S.D. I IO at 116,.
271 N.W. 767 (1937) (held that the jury could reasonably conclude that "even
though plaintiff was to pay a part of the expenses and do a part of the driving, the
control and management of the car was left to the defendant"); Coleman v. Bent, 100
Conn. 527 at 530, 124 A. 224 (1942), where several men were returning from a
fishing trip on which they shared current expenses, including gasoline, oil and garage
bills equally, and one of the passengers was driving, the court held, no joint enterprise,
and stated "The better considered cases hold that such common possession, and common right of control, resulting in common responsibility for negligent failure to control,
are the earmarks of the legal relation of a joint adventure in the operation of a vehicle";
Moen v. Zurich General Accident & Liability Ins. Co., 3 Wash. (2d) 347 at 352,
IOI P. (2d) 323 (1940) (where parties contributed toward operating expenses on
trip, the court held, "The payment of a portion of the expenses of a journey does not
of itself prove an agreement of joint venture"); Barnard v. Heather, 135 Neb. 513,
282 N.W. 534 (1935).
6
Carboneau v. Peterson, I Wash. (2d) 347 at 376, 95 P. (2d) 1043 (1939).
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which indicate a principal-agent relationship between passenger and driver; 7
the man at the wheel must be acting for the other as well as for himself; 8 the
circumstances must be such that the vehicle was in their common possession; 9
the operation by all the parties should be somewhat inconsistent with the owner's
sole and exclusive rights and obligations as owner of the car.10 The "right of
control" must be based upon the recognition of a right to be heard vested in
the passenger by reason of the relationship of the parties growing out of the
joint enterprise. Mere deference and desire to please the guest by acceptance
of suggestions as to route, etc.,11 or taking turns in the driving of the car,12 are
not sufficient to satisfy the requirement of control in a joint enterprise. Sharing
of expenses by the parties is evidence of the existence of a right of control, but
each case presents question of fact as to whether the other necessary elements
of the joint enterprise are present.13 Where the parties are travelling together
7 Carroll v. Hutchinson, 172 Va. 43, 200 S.E. 644 (1939); Farthing v. Hepinstall, 243 Mich. 380, 220 N.W. 708 (1928); Fox v. Lavender, 89 Utah II5 at II9,
56 P. (2d) 1049 (1936). In the last case, the court said, "Complete control means
that the principal could dictate when the car was to be used, the destination or where
it should go, the route it should take, and how it should be driven, whether slow or
fast, behind or around traffic, inside or outside the lane of traffic, etc. It is not necessary that the principal should be physically able to so direct or control, but only that
he has the right to." Query: If an essential element of a joint enterprise is equal right
to control, can it be said that the party contributing to the expenses of transportation
becomes a joint enterpriser and has an equal voice in the operation of the automobile
as above described?
8 Crescent Motor Co. v. Stone, 2II Ala. 516, IOI So. 49 (1924).
9 Noel v. LaPointe, 86 N. H. 162 at 165, 164 A. 769 (1933), stating "The
fact that the plaintiffs in the present case may have contributed to pay for the gasoline
' used upon the ride is unimportant; the defendant still retained 'his rights and obljgations as owner of his car.'"
1 ° Coleman v. Bent, 100 Conn. 527, 124 A. 224 (1924).
11,Carroll v. Hutchinson, 172 Va. 43, 200 S. E. 644 (1939); Stearns v. Lindow,
(App. D. C. 1934) 70 F. (2d) 738; State for use of Chairs v. Norfolk & W. Ry.,
151 Md. 679, 135 A. 827 (1927); Bryant v. Pacific Electric Co., 174 Cal. 737, 164
P. 385 (1917); Churchill v. Briggs, 225 Iowa u87, 282 N. W. 380 (1938).
12 Coleman v. Bent, IO0 Conn. 527, 124 A. 224 (1924); Zeigler v. Ryan, 65
S.D. II0, 271 N.W. 767 (1937). Contra: Counts v. Thomas, (Mo. App. 1933)
63 S.W. (2d) 416 (1933) (where one boy borrowed father's car to go pleasure riding
with a friend, and while friend was driving an accident occurred, held the driver was
the agent of the son of the owner and they were engaged in a joint enterprise).
13 Link v. Miller, 133 Kan. 469, 300 P. II05 (1931); Barnett v. Levy, 213
Ill. App. 129 (1919) (held that it was a question of fact for the jury whether the
driver had by virtue of the agreement to share expenses and the other circumstances
relinquished his exclusive right of control); Christopherson v. Minneapolis, St. P. &
S.S. M. Ry., 28 N. D. 128, 147 N. W. 791 (1914); Derrick v. Salt Lake & 0. Ry.,
50 Utah 573, 168 P. 335 (1917); Alexiou v. Nockas, 171 Wash. 369, 17 P. (2d)
91 I (1933); Coleman v. Bent, ,IOO Conn. 527, 124 A. 224 (1924); Manos v. James,
7 Wash. (2d) 695, II0 P. (2d) 887 (1941), commented on in 21 BosT. UNiv. L.
REv. 566 (1941). Contra: Frisorger v. Shepse, 251 Mich. 121 at 123, 230 N. W.
926 (1930), where owner-driver of car W:as invited to attend a dance and to bring
his car as transportation for the group, for the cost of which each member contributed
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for pleasure purposes in a hired vehicle, the cost of which had been shared
equally, the members of the party are deemed to have a mutual right of control
and are held to be joint enterprisers.14 Courts seem to be more willing to find
the requisite element of control as the basis for a. joint enterprise where the
parties share expenses of an automobile trip which grows out of a business venture.15 The relationship between parties to a joint enterprise may be affected
in three ways: (I) the contributory negligence of the driver will bar a recovery
by an occupant of that car against a negligent third person; ( 2) the negligence
of the driver of the car will make the occupant liable for injury to an innocent
third person; and (3) an occupant of the car may recover from the driver
of the car for injury caused by his negligence. 16 The overwhelming majority
of cases which have established the law of the joint enterprise as applied to
instances of expense-sharing between passenger and driver have involved either
(I) or (3) above. Only two cases have been found which hold the contributing
passenger liable for injury to innocent third persons caused by his negligent
driver; in the one case the parties were riding together in a hired vehicle,1 7 and
in the other case the parties were engaged in a business enterprise.18 It would
seem, therefore, that if (I) and ( 2) above are equally valid legal incidents of
the joint enterprise, the courts should not extend the joint enterprise doctrine
without very clear and definite evidence that the parties have intended to assume the obligations which the relationship imposes. Also, as between guest and
driver the scope of the doctrine of the joint enterprise should not be expanded
so as to destroy the effect of the "guest acts" of the various states by removing
equally. The court said: "They had agreed on a joint pleasure party. Every member
of the party had to do with the management and control of the enterprise. They
shared equally in the expense. The fact that the defendant was driving the car is
material, but not controlling of the question. As driver, he was acting as agent for
the other members of the party. They had as much right to direct its movements and
speed as he had. Each had a right to be heard in carrying out the details of the trip.
This equal right of control is a very important matter to be considered in determining
whether it was a joint enterprise." Query: Is there any legal basis for the right to
control which the court here seems to assume exists?
14
Christopherson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S. M. Ry., 28 N. D. 128, 147 N. W.
791 (1914); Adams v. Swift, 172 Mass. 521 at 524, 52 N. E. 1068 (1899). In the
latter case, the court said: "the mother of the young woman who was driving when
the accident happened, was an equal promoter and manager, and not a mere guest."
The facts show that the mother of the young lady driver exercised some actual control
over the driver by giving directions in the driving of the carriage.
15
Derrick v. Salt Lake & 0. Ry., 50 Utah 573, 168 P. 335 (1917); Judge v.
Wallen, 98 Neb. 154, 152 N. W. 318 (1915).
16
HARPER, ToRTS 320 (1933).
17
Adams v. Swift, 172 Mass. 521, 52 N. E. 1068 (1899).
18
Judge v. Wallen, 98 Neb. 154, 152 N. W. 318 (1915). In the following
cases, which do not involve a sharing of expenses, passengers have been held liable, as
joint adventurers, for injuries to third parties caused by negligence of their drivers:
Crescent Motor Co. v. Stone, 211 Ala. 576, IOI So. 49 (1924); Carpenter v. Campbell Automobile Co., 159 Iowa 52, 140 N. W. 225 (1913); Fox v. Lavender, 89 Utah
115, 56 P. (2d) 1049 (1936); Howard v. Zimmerman, 120 Kan. 77, 242 P. 131
(1926); VanHorn v. Simpson, 35 S. D. 640, 153 N. W. 883 (1915); Boyd v. Close,
82 Colo. 150, 257 P. 1079 (1927).
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a person from the status of a guest on facts showing only a sharing of expenses
between the parties.19

Benjamin Quigg*

19 McCann v. Hoffman, 9 Cal. (2d) 279 at 285, 70 P. (2d) 909 (1937), holding that the sharing of expenses "does not transform into a passenger one who without
such exchange would be a guest. • .. It is obvious that if a different result obtained
under any construction of the (guest] statute its purposes would be defeated and its
effect annulled"; Chaplowe v. Powsner, II9 Conn. 188 at 192, 175 A. 470 (1934)
("Although the operation of the statute in denying a right of recovery should not be
extended, by construction, beyond the correction of the evils and the attainment of
the social objects sought by it ••• equally, the scope of the term 'guest' should not be
so restricted as to defeat or impair those purposes, as would be the case if one riding
as a mere recipient of hospitality [passenger supplying theatre tickets, driver supplying
transportation] be excluded by the status of a guest"); Olefsky v. Ludwig, 242 App.
Div. 637, 272 N. Y.. S. 158 (1934) (holding that contribution for gas and oil does not
constitute payment for transportation removing person from class of "guest").
*University of Michigan Law School.-Ed.

